appear more financially risky, in turn triggering widespread concern over counterparty risk. The high leverage of many of these firms effectively required fire-sales of assets, exacerbating the fall.
Although the Dodd-Frank Act prescribes many steps to attempt to prevent another financial crisis, most of these steps focus on banks and other financial institutions, not on financial markets. Such a limited focus worked well when banks and financial institutions were the primary source of corporate financing. But the financial crisis reveals that this focus is insufficient now that companies obtain much of their financing directly through financial markets-such as through securitization financing. 4 Financial institutions and financial markets can both be triggers, and also transmitters, of systemic risk.
ANALYSIS
So how should we regulate systemic risk? The primary if not sole justification for regulating financial risk is maximizing economic efficiency.
Because systemic risk is a form of financial risk, efficiency should be a central goal in its regulation.
But systemic risk creates an added regulatory dimension: without regulation, the externalities-harm to third parties-would not be prevented or internalized because systemic risk is a risk to the financial system itself.
Market participants are motivated to protect themselves, but they are not as directly motivated to protect the system as a whole.
As a result, there is a type of "tragedy of the commons," a collective action problem in which the benefits of exploiting finite capital resources accrue to individual market participants, each of whom is motivated to maximize use of the resources, whereas the costs of exploitation, which affect the real economy, are distributed among an even wider class of persons.
4 Any regulation of systemic risk thus should focus not only on traditional efficiency but also on stability of the financial system.
In examining regulatory approaches to systemic risk, one should also take into account the costs of regulation. Consider each in turn.
(i) Limiting an institution's leverage could reduce the risk that an institution fails in the first place. It also could reduce the likelihood of transmitting financial contagion between institutions. But limiting leverage can create significant costs. Some leverage is good, and there is no optimal across-the-board amount of leverage that is right for every institution. The Dodd-Frank Act, however, directs the Federal Reserve to set "prudential"
capital standards for certain large financial institutions, 7 including a maximum debt-to-equity ratio of 15:1.
(ii) Limiting an institution's right to make investments is a highly paternalistic approach, substituting a blanket regulatory prescription for a firm's own business judgment. One should be highly skeptical of any rule that attempts to protect a sophisticated financial institution from itself.
Dodd-Frank implementation of the Volker Rule, however, attempts to do precisely that by limiting the ability of banks and certain other financial institutions to engage in "proprietary trading"-essentially investing in securities for their own account. Acting as a lender of last resort to institutions can be costly, however. By providing a lifeline, a lender of last resort can at least theoretically foster moral hazard by encouraging financial institutions-especially those that believe they are "too big to fail"-to be fiscally reckless. It also can shift costs to taxpayers since loans made to institutions will not be repaid if the institutions eventually fail. One way that Dodd-Frank attempts to avoid the need to make emergency loans is by requiring banks and-to the extent designated as "systemically important," other financial firms-to be subject to a range of capital, leverage, and liquidity requirements and periodic "stress testing." It also requires these entities to submit a resolution plan (a "living will") that sets forth how, if it fails, the firm would wind down in a way that minimizes systemic impact. The intention is to prevent a failure and, if a failure occurs, to mitigate the need for emergency loans by allowing the firm to fail. The ultimate question, though, will be whether the ex ante plan matches the ex post reality.
Regardless of how one views a lender of last resort to financial institutions, the financial crisis has shown that, in an era of disintermediation, more attention needs to be focused on providing liquidity to financial markets as necessary to keep them functioning. This approach
should also be less costly than lending to institutions. A market liquidity provider of last resort, especially if it acts at the outset of a market panic, can profitably invest in securities at a deep discount from the market price and still provide a "floor" to how low the market will drop. Buying at a deep discount will mitigate moral hazard and also make it likely that the market liquidity provider will be repaid.
Reducing Complexity. An obvious way to address complexity would be to require investments and other financial products to be more standardized, so market participants do not need to engage in as much due diligence.
One of the goals of Dodd-Frank is to standardize more derivatives transactions. To this end, the Act requires many derivatives to be cleared through clearinghouses, which generally require a high degree of standardization in the derivatives they clear.
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The overall economic impact of standardization is unclear, though, because standardization can interfere with the ability of parties to achieve the efficiencies that arise when firms issue securities tailored to particular needs of investors.
RECOMMENDATIONS
I would recommend at least three regulatory initiatives that go beyond Dodd-Frank: (1) require that managers, including secondary managers, of financial institutions be compensated based more on long-term firm performance; (2) establish a market liquidity provider of last resort; (3) require financial institutions of systemic significance to contribute to a fund that would be used to mitigate systemic externalities.
Let me expand on the latter two recommendations, which may not be obvious on their face.
A market liquidity provider of last resort would have the best chance of minimizing a systemic collapse under any number of circumstances.
Chaos theory supports the concept of a market liquidity provider of last resort. In complex engineering systems, as in complex financial markets, failures are inevitable. Therefore modularity is needed to break the transmission of these failures and limit their systemic consequences. Such a mechanism usually exists (or should exist) for banks, in the form of a liquidity provider of last resort; we also need this type of mechanism for complex financial markets.
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Recent experience in the financial crisis supports establishment of a market liquidity provider of last resort. In response to the collapse of the commercial paper market, the Federal Reserve created the Commercial
Paper Funding Facility ("CPFF") to act as a lender of last resort for that market, with the goal of addressing "temporary liquidity distortions" by purchasing commercial paper from highly rated issuers that could not otherwise sell their paper. 11 The CPFF apparently helped to stabilize the commercial paper market.
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One might ask why, if a market liquidity provider of last resort can invest at a deep discount to stabilize markets and still make money, private investors won't also do so, thereby eliminating the need for some sort of governmental market liquidity provider. why free-market factors do not limit that transmission. 14 The tragedy of the commons, for example, is certainly part of that explanation.
15
The Dodd-Frank Act nonetheless has the potential to ultimately reach beyond politically targeted responses. The Act delegates much of the regulatory details to administrative rulemaking, in many cases after the relevant government agencies engage in further study. Perhaps even more significantly, the Act creates a Financial Stability Oversight Council, part of whose mission is to monitor and identify potential systemic threats in order to find regulatory gaps. The Council will be aided in this task by a newlycreated and, we all should hope, nonpartisan Office of Financial Research.
Thank you.
